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INTRUDERS AT THE DEATH HOUSE:
LIMITING THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION
IN EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
DARYL M. SCHUMACHER*

It is my opinion that a man who would willingly sit in a small cell
for 24 hours a day year after year, merely postponing the inevitable
execution, is the irrationalman.
Lloyd Wayne Hampton
INTRODUCTION
Jennifer is a woman who has endured a physically abusive
husband for the last five years. After a night out with her friends,
Jennifer comes home to her drunk husband, who is in a violent
mood. Knowing the price of another confrontation, Jennifer grabs
a gun. He begins to beat her, but she cannot endure the beating,
and shoots and kills her husband at point blank range. The police
promptly arrest Jennifer and take her to the police station. After
confessing to the killing of her husband, the jury convicts Jennifer
of first degree murder and sentences her to death.
Jennifer knows she must pay for her crime and wants the
state to execute her as soon as possible because she cannot endure
a life behind bars. She writes to the state supreme court, the governor, and the United States Supreme Court, and asks that no further appeals be filed on her behalf. Subsequently, the state holds
a hearing to determine whether Jennifer is competent to waive her
appeals.2 The state supreme court finds Jennifer competent to
waive her appeals, and schedules her execution.
In response, members of an anti-capital punishment group in* J.D. Candidate 1998.
1. Killer Fighting to Die, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 19, 1992, at 4A

[hereinafter Killer Fighting].

2. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 152 (1990) (stating that a
competent decision to waive further appeals must be "knowing and intelligent"). In certain situations one or more psychiatric experts administer tests
and conduct psychiatric evaluations of the detainee. People's Response in Opposition to Third-Party Petition for Executive Clemency at 3, People v. Garcia,
651 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. 1995) (No. 21411) [hereinafter People's Response]. The
court then makes a decision based on the opinions of the mental health experts, and the prisoner herself, as to whether the decision was "knowing and
intelligent." People v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 113 (Ill. 1995).
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tervene on Jennifer's behalf without her consent. Members of this
group petition the State Prisoner Review Board to recommend executive clemency' to the governor. After considering the Board's
affirmative recommendation, the Governor commutes Jennifer's
sentence from death to natural life in prison.4
Currently thirty-six states have enacted statutes that impose
the death penalty for certain crimes.5 For example in Illinois, fifteen crimes are punishable by death.' As of March, 1996, 155
people in Illinois were on death row awaiting execution by lethal
injection.! Illinois requires prisoners to file mandatory appeals of
their death sentences.8 However, certain appeals are waivable at
the prisoner's discretion.9 In addition to the possibility of a detainee's judicial appeals, state governors typically have discretion

3. See Henry Pietrkowski, Note, The Diffusion of Due Process in Capital
Cases of Actual Innocence After Herrera, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1391, 1402
(1995) (discussing various forms of executive clemency). Executive clemency
is a power vested in the Governor by most state constitutions and in the
President by the U.S. Constitution. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. This power
gives the President or a Governor the ability to pardon or commute a detainee's sentence, or grant a reprieve. Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy
Strained:Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEx. L. REV. 569,
575 (1991). Pardons are the broadest form of clemency and releases the offender from any and all punishment for a particular crime. Id. at 576. Executives commonly grant pardons to restore the reputation and civil rights of
an individual. Id. Commutation of a sentence is a more limited form of clemency and is merely a reduction in the severity of a punishment. Id. Governors grant commutations to shorten a prisoner's sentence or to make a prisoner eligible for parole. Id. A reprieve is nothing more than a postponement
of punishment. Id. at 578. Often this is done to give an offender an opportunity to complete his or her appeals. Id.
4. This hypothetical situation closely corresponds to the turn of events in
People v. Garcia,651 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. 1995).
5. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF STATES 536-37

(1994). As of December 1992, 36 states allow the death penalty. Id. A number of states carry out execution by electrocution: Alabama, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id. Other states implement death by lethal injection or gas: Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Wyoming and Texas. Id. Other states
use more unusual means of execution: Idaho and Utah cause death by lethal
injection or firing squad, and Montana and New Hampshire allow execution
by lethal injection or hanging. Id.
6. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(1) - (15) (West 1995). For example, Illinois imposes
the death penalty for murder committed along with at least one of fifteen aggravating factors, such as when the victim is a police officer, firefighter, or
prison guard, or when the murder is committed during a highiacking or the
course of another felony. Id.
7. Telephone Interview with representative of Office of Public Information, Illinois Department of Corrections, Springfield, IL (Mar. 11, 1996).
8. People's Response, supra note 2, at 3.
9. Id.
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to intervene in capital cases."0
Prisoners and state governors do not alone possess the right
to influence or change a judicially imposed sentence of death. In
some circumstances, third parties can intervene in capital cases
seeking either executive 1' or judicial relief on behalf of the prisoner.' For example, third parties may intervene when the prisoner
is incompetent and cannot make a rational decision for himself.3
Third parties, however, have intervened
against a prisoner's will
4
even when the prisoner is competent.1
Since the reinstatement of the death penalty in Illinois in
1977,'5 three highly publicized cases involved third-party intervention in the judicial and executive clemency contexts. 6 In all
three cases, the prisoners opposed such interference. 7 Despite
prisoner opposition, the third party had some impact in each
case. 8 Such third-party intervention is problematic because it allows anyone to assert his or her own interest under the guise of aid
to the detainee.
The danger of allowing improper third parties access to the

10. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1610.180 (1994) (vesting in the

governor of the State of Illinois the discretionary authority to grant reprieves
(a delay in carrying out the sentence), pardons (a complete release from custody), or commutations (a reduction of the severity of the sentence) of a death
sentence).
11. Id. The executive relief available is clemency. Id.; See generally Hugo
A. Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255 (1990-1991) (providing a detailed discussion of
recent executive clemency review of death sentence cases). See also infra
notes 26-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of executive clemency.
12. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 153 (1990) (demonstrating
that third parties may become involved in federal habeas corpus proceedings).
The judicial form of relief is federal habeas corpus relief. See also infra notes
63-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of habeas corpus relief.
13. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163. A third party may gain "next-friend"
standing when there is an adequate explanation for the detainee's inability to
petition on his or her own behalf. Id.
14. People's Response, supra note 2, at 1, 3.
15. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)-(b) (West 1994); EdgarDefends His Decision to Grant
Garcia Clemency, STATE J. REG., Jan. 20, 1996, at 3.
16. Bill O'Connell, Bill Would Limit Third-PartyAppeals House OK's Banning Most Unwanted Petitions on Behalf of Death-Row Inmates, PEORIA J.
STAR, Feb. 22, 1996, at All. The three individuals who wanted to die are:
Charles Walker, a convicted murder whose death was delayed by the Coalition Against Capital Punishment; Lloyd Wayne Hampton, a convicted murderer whose death wish was interfered with by the Illinois Coalition Against
the Death Penalty; and Guinevere Garcia whose death sentence was commuted in part as a result of efforts by Amnesty International. Id. Rob Karwath & William Grady, Hampton Asks, Gets Delay in His Execution, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 11, 1992, at 1; Killer Fighting,supra note 1, at 1.
17. O'Connell, supra note 16, at 1; Karwath & Grady, supra, note 16, at 12.
18. O'Connell, supra note 16, at 1.
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executive clemency forum is that it exposes the forum to abuses."
Third parties can attempt to achieve their own political, social or
moral agendas by turning a clemency proceeding into a political
controversy or media event.2' Although third parties may have
relevant arguments on the validity of the death penalty in general,
the proper arena for the presentation of such arguments is the
legislature, not the executive clemency forum.
Instead of recognizing the executive clemency process as a
socially sanctioned method of dispensing mercy or enhancing justice based exclusively on the particular circumstances of each case,
third parties have in recent years abused the executive clemency
process. This abuse has resulted from the third-parties' attempt to
make the process a visible forum for their own political, social or
moral beliefs.
The purpose of this Comment is to suggest ways to diminish
such third-party abuse of executive clemency. Specifically, this
Comment focuses on the disparity of the standing requirements
between habeas corpus and executive clemency petitions. It also
examines the impact on the rights of the detainee when a third
party attempts to intervene against the detainee's wishes. One
primary focus of any death penalty intervention issue should be
whether a third party has proper standing to interfere, either in
the judicial or executive clemency context. Ordinarily, the purpose
of standing is to ensure that the party seeking relief has alleged a
strong enough personal stake to assure that all issues involved in a
detainee's death sentence are presented clearly.2' Moreover, a
standing requirement also alleviates the political abuse by third
parties.
There are two specific situations where third parties may intervene in death penalty cases: 1) under the doctrine of federal habeas corpus, 22 and 2) under executive clemency.2" Federal habeas
19. Illinois State Representative James Durkin characterized a recent high
profile executive clemency hearing involving a celebrity as a "sideshow." Bill
Limits Third-Party Death Appeals, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 8, 1996, at 1
[hereinafter Bill Limits].
20. Sometimes third-party organizations exploit celebrities to plead on behalf of the detainee. For example, during the clemency proceedings of
Guinevere Garcia, Bianca Jagger, former wife of rock star Mick Jagger, and

Amnesty International had filed a third-party petition on behalf of Garcia. See
id. Jagger's participation drew widespread interest and attention to Mrs.
Garcia's clemency action. Id.

21. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990).
22. Id. at 154. The writ of habeas corpus is a procedure for obtaining a ju-

dicial determination of whether a detainee's confinement or death sentence is
legal. Id. Often habeas relief is sought to determine whether a state criminal

conviction or sentence is constitutional. Id. One consideration in this determination is whether the confinement is consistent with constitutionally mandated due process of law. Id.
23. See infra notes 26-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of execu-
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corpus relief requires that a third-party meet certain wellestablished standing requirements, while most state rules involving executive clemency generally do not impose any standing requirements on third party petitioners.' As a result, the detainee's
right to oppose a third-party's interference with his or her death
sentence varies depending on the context in which it arises. Because of this disparity in standing requirements, the detainee's
right to oppose intervention
in the clemency context is weaker
25
than with habeas relief.

Part I of this Comment examines the history of executive
clemency and explores its purposes. Part II discusses the origins of
habeas corpus relief and examines the differences between executive clemency and habeas corpus petitions. Part III addresses the
need to set limitations on third-party petitioners in the executive
clemency context. Part IV examines corrective measures in the
area of executive clemency, including newly enacted legislation in
Illinois. Part IV also proposes model requirements for executive
clemency petitions that would place significant limitations on
third-party intervention.
I.

EXECUTWVE CLEMENCY

Executive clemency is often the last available form of relief for
a death row inmate. Once a prisoner has exhausted all of his judicial appeals, the prisoner has one final tribunal to address for
relief: the executive branch of the state government. 0 Most state
constitutions place the clemency power in the governor.21 Some
states, however, have created advisory pardon boards to aid the
governor in this decision.n Section A provides a brief history of executive clemency. Section B examines the purpose of executive
clemency. Section C discusses recent intervening third-party
abuses of executive clemency. Finally, Section D examines the effects of third-party abuses of executive clemency.

tive clemency.
24. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 20, § 1610.180 (1994) (requiring merely
that a petition "shall be signed by the applicant or other person in his behalf').
The Illinois code does not specify that a third party meet any kind of standing
requirements. Id.
25. Compare ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 20, § 1610.180 (1994) (requiring no
standing requirements for intervention into executive clemency proceedings)
with Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 149 (discussing the judically derived standing requirements for intervention in federal habeas corpus proceedings).
26. Pietrkowski, supra note 3, at 1402.
27. Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Executive Clemency in Capital
Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 136, 141 (1965); Pietrkowski, supra note 3, at 1402.
28. Pietrkowski, supra note 3, at 1402. Some states require joint approval
between the governor and the board before clemency can be granted. Id.;
Kobil, supra note 3, at 586.
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A. History

Clemency power originated centuries ago when a monarch
had the authority to reduce punishment as an act of mercy.' In
England, the King administered executive clemency."0 Executive
clemency in the United States stems from the concept of clemency
used in England.3 In the United States, clemency regulations
typically do not bind executive officials to any formal standards for
their decisions.3 Therefore, state governors generally have few3
formal guidelines when making decisions involving clemency.
Historically, state legislatures have given executives a wide latitude of discretion in making clemency determinations.' While
state governments have rarely adopted stringent standards to
guide executives when deciding clemency issues, traditionally, executives base clemency upon two grounds: mercy and the desire to
correct judicial error."
B. Purpose of Executive Clemency

The first basis of clemency involves a "mercy-based" process.36
Clemency, as a mercy -based process, is essentially arbitrary. 7 For
instance, governors sometimes grant clemency when a death row
29. Pietrkowski, supra note 3, at 1401. Clemency is the oldest type of leniency and is alive in one form or another in every state in the United States.
Kobil, supra note 3, at 575. All forms of clemency derive from the sovereign's
power to extend mercy. Id. Although mercy is a common basis for clemency,
almost any reason will suffice. Id.
30. Kobil, supra note 3, at 586; Pietrkowski supra note 3, at 1402-03. Historically, the purpose of clemency was to make sure that justice was administered with mercy. Id. at 1401. However, through the ages, the political process has controlled the decision to grant mercy through clemency. Id.
31. Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 27, at 140; Pietrkowski, supra note 3,
at 1402.
32. Pietrkowski supra note 3, at 1402. Traditionally the power to grant
clemency rested within the sole discretion of state governors. Id. See also
Bedau, supra note 11, at 259-61 (discussing various rationales that governors
use in commuting death sentences to prison sentences).
33. Pietrkowski, supra note 3, at 1402.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1404. Pietrkowski lists three grounds for clemency, the third being a due process entitlement. Few courts, however, have held clemency to
be an interest which the Due Process Clause protects. Id. at 1411.
36. Id. at 1404. Reasons for basing clemency on mercy vary depending on
the "particular moral circumstances of the case." Id. at 1405. For example,
Battered Woman Syndrome has been at issue in clemency proceedings when a
woman strikes back at her abusive husband. Id. The argument in that situation is that moral circumstances, i.e. the severe abuse, justifies an executive's
grant of mercy to the detainee. Id. An example outside the capital context is
when a mother steals food for the necessity of feeding her children. Id.
There, the moral obligation to feed the children should allow the executive to
extend mercy through clemency. Id.
37. Id. at 1405 (citing United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (1 Pet.) 150, 160-61
(1833)) (setting forth various factors to be considered in granting clemency).
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inmate displays signs of rehabilitation.8 Other times governors
simply act out of a sense of pity for a detainee's rough circumstances in life. Factors also affecting the clemency decision may be
other types of mitigating circumstances such as the physical or
mental condition of the detainee.89
°
In addition, executive clemency enhances the justice process.4
Under this theory of relief, executive clemency seeks to correct any
wrongs that may have occurred in the judicial process." The consideration of important evidence or other information excluded at
trial is one way clemency protects against judicial error.' Under
either of these theories, the executive need not provide an explanation for his or her use of power because the decision is entirely
discretionary. 43 The doctrine of executive clemency entails a specific evaluation of the equities of a particular punishment. It is not
a forum to seek changes in the law or societal value system. The
sole purpose of executive clemency is to either extend mercy or
correct judicial error based on the circumstances of each case.
C. Third-partyAbuse of Executive Clemency

There are groups who oppose the death penalty because of
their moral, social, or philosophical beliefs. These groups often intervene into the executive clemency process solely based upon
their opposition to the death penalty." Sometimes these groups
interfere against the detainee's will and without his or her consent. 4"
38. Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 27, at 168; Pietrkowski, supra note 3,
at 1405-06.
39. Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 27, at 159-77; Pietrkowski, supra note

3, at 1406 n.122. Factors that frequently play a part in an executive's decision to grant clemency include: 1) the nature of the crime; 2) doubt as to guilt;
3) fairness of the trial; 4) relative guilt and disparity of sentences; 5) rehabilitation; 6) dissents and inferences drawn from the courts; 7) recommendations
of the prosecution and the trial judge; 8) political pressure and publicity; 9)
the clemency authorities' view on capital punishment; and 10) the role of

precedent. Id.
40. Pietrkowski, supra note 3, at 1408-9.
41. Id.
42. Deborah Leavy, A Matter of Life and Death: Due Process Protection in
Capital Clemency Proceedings, 90 YALE L.J. 889, 905 (1981); Pietrkowski, supra note 3, at 1409. Some claim that the admission of evidence that might

otherwise be excluded at trial, benefits the death-row inmate. Id. at 1407.
43. Pietrkowski, supra note 3, at 1406.
44. Id. at 327. The modern trend for opponents of the death penalty is to
forgoe attempts at national prohibition of the death penalty. Id. Instead,
abolitionists concentrate their efforts on a case-by-case system and attempt to

halt executions based upon the mitigating factors of each individual situation.
Id. See also Latest Death Penalty Case Not Getting Much Interest, STATE J.

REG., Sept. 16, 1996, at 5 (discussing how organizations that oppose the death
penalty attempt to raise public awareness of the issue).
45. Anthony v. Alfieri, Mitigation,Mercy, and Delay: The Moral Politics of
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6
an Illinois court sentenced
For example, in People v. Garcia,"
Guinevere Garcia to death for the murder of her husband. 7 After
filing the mandatory appeals, Garcia expressed her desire to waive
her discretionary appeals."8 The court then put Garcia through a
competency hearing where experts determined that she was capable of making a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of her rights."9
Thereafter, third parties, including members of Amnesty International such as Bianca Jagger, intervened and urged the Illinois
Prisoner Review Board [hereinafter "IPRB"] to recommend clemency to the Governor.5° After his review of Garcia's case, the Governor then commuted Garcia's sentence from death to natural life
in prison."'

Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 328 (1996)
[hereinafter Alfieri]. Alfieri discusses a concept called purposivism which he
defines as the "normative autonomy of lawyers from clients and society." Id.
Thus, he asserts that purposivism allows lawyers to make decisions outside of
the client's will. Id.
46. 651 N.E.2d 100 (Ill. 1995). After the court sentenced the defendant to
death, third-party petitioners intervened and asked the Illinois Prisoner Review Board to recommend executive clemency to Illinois Governor James Edgar. People's Response, supra note 2, at 11. Subsequently, Governor Edgar
commuted the defendant's sentence from death to natural life in prison.
James Edgar, News from the Office of the Governorat 3, Jan. 16, 1996.
47. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d at 105. It should be noted that the defendant in
this case was previously tried and convicted of the murder of her daughter,
and four aggravated arsons. Id. at 103. Originally the defendant had stated
that her daughter's death was accidental due to suffocation. Id. at 105. It
was not until four years later that the defendant confessed to both the murder
of her 11-month-old daughter and the four aggravated arsons. Id.
48. People's Response, supra note 2, at 3. Mrs. Garcia drafted letters to
the Illinois Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, and to Governor Jim Edgar, expressing her wish to withdraw all appeals for relief, both
judicial and executive. Id.
49. Id. A total of three psychiatric experts evaluated the defendant for this
hearing. Id. Her guardian ad litem, who was contesting her decision, hired
two of the experts. Id. All experts concluded that her decision was knowing
and intelligent. Id.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Edgar, supra note 46, at 3. Governor Edgar's press release stated in
relevant part the follows:
Indeed, this action on my part should not be construed in any way as a
commentary on the victim, Mr. Garcia, or as demeaning in any way the
value of his life. Guinevere Garcia should never be free again. But I
have concluded the punishment decreed for her was not typical. Horrible as was her crime, it is an offense comparable to those that judges
and jurors have determined over and over again should not be punishable by death. So, I am commuting her sentence to natural life in
prison without parole. My decision is contrary to Guinevere Garcia's
expressed wish to let the execution go forward-a wish she repeated
several times forcefully. But it is not the state's responsibility to carry
out the wishes of a defendant. It is the state's responsibility to assure
that the death penalty continues to be administered properly.

1997]

Third-PartyIntervention in Executive Clemency

One defense that the intervenors pursued was Battered
Woman Syndrome, yet the Governor conceded that the defendant
did not suffer from Battered Woman Syndrome.52 The Governor
stated that he based his decision on other factors. 5 It appears
from the press release that the Governor's decision was not based
on the theory the third party asserted.' Rather, the Governor
based his decision on the relevant facts of the case.5
The judicial doctrine of standing would have barred the thirdparty petition because the third party could not meet the requirements of any theory of standing.6 Had the IPRB barred Bianca
Jagger's petition, the Governor would nevertheless have the
authority to grant clemency. Presumably a sua sponte clemency
review by Governor Edgar would have resulted in a similar decision because his decision was based on the specific acts of the case
and not the theory asserted in the third-party petition. 57 However,
had the IPRB barred the third-party petition, the third-party could
not have abused the system and made such a media event of the
IPRB hearing.5 The only significant effect of Bianca Jagger's petition was attracting the public's attention to the moral questionability of the death penalty. Implementing certain standing requirements in the executive clemency context would correct the
improprieties of third-party intervention on behalf of detainees
against their wills.
D. Effects of Abuse

In most states there are few limitations on third-party intervention in the clemency context. 9 Therefore third-party organizations can intervene in capital cases at will. In addition, liberal
clemency regulations may unduly burden capital prisoners when
52. Id. at 2. Governor Edgar explained that "[slome who have sought
clemency on her behalf have raised the possibility that she was a victim herself-a victim of Battered Woman Syndrome. However, the evidence does not
support that assertion." Id. See generally Christine Noelle Becker, Note,
Clemency For Killers? PardoningBattered Women Who Strike Back, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 297 (1995) (suggesting that states be more liberal in granting executive clemency to victims of domestic violence). Numerous organizations
have organized specifically in order to prepare and file clemency petitions on
behalf of battered women. Id. at 335-36.
53. Edgar, supra note 46, at 3.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See infra notes 75-106 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
theories of standing.
57. Edgar, supra note 46, at 1-3.
58. Bill Limits, supra note 19, at 1. Representative James Durkin labeled
the IPRB hearing a "sideshow" where celebrity Bianca Jagger of Amnesty International pled for relief on behalf of Garcia. Id. Durkin added that law was
necessary to avoid this from occurring again. Id.
59. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1610.180 (1994).
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third parties intervene against the prisoners' will.' When thirdparties petition for executive clemency, they may attempt to assert
their own political, philosophical, or social agendas in an effort to
change the law. Because the executive branch of government is
the wrong forum to assert legislative grievances, such third-party
intervention is an abuse of the system. Making matters worse is
the fact that executive clemency is judicially unreviewable. 6' In
the judicial context, constitutional standing requirements eradicate much of the abuse that third parties freely get away with in
the executive clemency context.6
II. DISPARITY BETWEEN HABEAS CORPUS AND EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY RELIEF
This Part discusses habeas corpus relief in general and explores three specific types of third-party standing which the courts
recognize. Section A provides a brief outline of the history and
policies underlying habeas corpus relief. Section A also provides
detailed analysis of jus tertii, citizen, and next-friend types of
standing. Section B compares habeas corpus relief to executive
clemency.
A. Habeas Corpus Relief
In the judicial realm, individuals use the writ of habeas corpus to seek relief on the basis that the detention of a prisoner is
unconstitutional.' Third parties, however, must meet specific requirements before they can petition on behalf of a prisoner. Section 1 explores the origins of habeas corpus relief. Section 2 discusses the three theories of standing that third parties may
advance when seeking habeas relief.
1.

Habeas Corpus Origins

law.6

The writ of habeas corpus originates from English common
The United States Constitution incorporates this concept.6

60. A death-row inmate should have a fundamental right over his fate
without undesired interference from third-parties. The injury in fact is to the
death-row inmate, and he or she should be the only party making crucial decisions regarding his or her death sentence.
61. Leavy, supra note 42, at 894. The executive is accountable to the people of his or her state through the electoral system. Id.
62. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976).
63. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990). Reasons that a detention may be unconstitutional include that the trial was unfair, or the defendant had ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
64. See Wilson v. Lane, 697 F. Supp. 1489, 1494-99 (S.D. IM. 1988)
(explaining the three types of standing: citizen, next friend, andjus tertii).
65. Michele M. Jochner, Till Habeas Do Us Part: Recent Supreme Court
Habeas Corpus Rulings, 81 ILL. B.J. 250, 250 (1993).
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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Several federal statutory enactments have defined the writ of habeas corpus relief." One enactment, the Judiciary Act of 1867,6
extended habeas corpus relief to state prisoners.69 In 1966, Conrulings on
gress gave federal habeas courts the right to make
7
questions of law and on applications of law to fact.
In the context of capital cases,7 ' petitioners can use habeas
corpus relief to challenge the constitutionality of a death sentence.7 ' Habeas relief is available to the prisoner himself, or to a
third-party acting on the prisoner's behalf.71 When a third party
attempts to seek habeas corpus relief, he or she must first demonstrate proper standing to address the court.7 '
2.

Types of JudicialStanding

Courts will not consider the merits of a claim until a thirdparty petitioner establishes the requisite standing to bring his or
her claim.75 The doctrine of standing determines whether a dispute is properly resolvable through the judicial system, M rather

67. Jochner, supra note 65, at 250.

68. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 39th Cong. , Sess. II., ch. 28, par. 1, 14 Stat. 385.
69. Id.
70. Id. Federal courts must defer to state court findings of fact in habeas
cases. Id.
71. For the purposes of this Comment, "capital cases" are cases in which
the defendant has been sentenced to death.
72. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 459 U.S. 149, 154 (1990). Basis for the claim of
an unconstitutional death sentence include ineffective assistance of counsel,
and an unfair trial. Id.
73. In re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
74. Whitmore, 459 U.S. at 154.
75. Id.; see Brewer v. Lewis, 989 F.2d 1021, 1032 (9th Cir. 1993)
(dismissing a next-friend petition by the mother of a detainee because she
failed to establish standing since no genuine obstacle prevented the detainee
from filing himself); see also Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637, 643 (11th Cir.
1992) (finding that the sister of detainee lacked standing as detainee's nextfriend because the detainee was competent to waive his federal habeas corpus
right); Franz v. Lockhart, 700 F. Supp. 1005, 1025 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (holding
that petitioner lacked standing as next-friend of detainee because detainee
was competent to waive his federal habeas corpus rights); But cf In re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. at 495 (appointing defendant's counsel as next-friend to
petition for habeas relief on detainee's behalf after habeas petitioner was declared incompetent to waive further habeas petitions).
76. Whitmore, 459 U.S. at 155. In this case, the lower court sentenced the
defendant to death for murder. Id. at 152. The defendant made a plea for expedited review of his waiver of direct appeal of his death sentence. Id. The
lower court held that the detainee was competent to make rational decisions.
Id. Whitmore attempted to intervene as a third party and petitioned for habeas corpus relief on behalf of both the detainee and himself as an individual.
Id. at 160. The Supreme Court rejected petitioner's claim based on nextfriend standing because detainee was capable of making rational choices. Id.
at 165. The Court also rejected the petitioner's claim as an individual because
there was no injury in fact. Id. at 157.
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7
than through another tribunal.
Article III of the United States Constitution requires that two
elements be met before a federal court has jurisdiction over a habeas corpus action.78 The first element requires a "case or controversy."79 A "case or controversy" ensures that an adversarial relationship between the parties exists." The second element requires
"injury in fact."8 This element ensures that the party to the suit
2
has a sufficient interest in the outcome of the suit. When a thirdparty petitioner satisfies these two elements, he or she can invoke
specific theories of standing.83 Thus, when petitioning the court for
habeas corpus relief, third-party petitioners may use three differ8
ent theories of standing: jus tertii, citizen, and next-friend. ' The
appropriate theory depends largely on the circumstances of each
case.

a. Jus Tertii Standing
Under the theory of jus tertii, a third party may claim individual standing to assert the detainee's rights" "in pursuit of [his]
own interests."88 Jus tertii standing has three requirements. First,

77. For the purposes of this Comment, "other tribunals" refers to the executive or legislative branches of government.
78. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
79. Id. Article III of the U.S. Constitution limits the power of federal
courts to "cases" and "controversies." Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471
(1982). A petitioner does not comply with Article III simply because he or she
asks a court for an advisory opinion. Id. The judicial power of the United
States "is not an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of
legislative or executive acts." Id.
80. Id.
81. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976). "[Ilnjury in fact is a sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of [a] suit to make it a case or controversy subject to a federal courts Article III jurisdiction." Id. at 112. In Singleton, two physicians brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a
state statute excluding certain abortions from Medicaid coverage. Id. at 109.
The district court dismissed the plaintiffs case, since they did not have adequate standing because there was no "injury in fact." Id. at 111. Injury in
fact is a necessary component of Article III to establish a "case or controversy." Id. at 112. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had standing
because, if they won the suit, they would benefit by receiving payment for the
abortions. Id. at 113.
82. Id. at 112.
83. Wilson v. Lane, 697 F. Supp. 1489, 1494-95 (S.D. Ill. 1988).
84. Id. at 1494.
85. Id. There are two types of individual standing, jus tertii, and citizen
standing. Id. Under either of these theories, the petitioner asserts the detainee's rights to further the petitioner's own interest. Id. Next-friend
standing is not a type of "individual standing" because the petitioner asserts
the detainee's interest, not his own. Id. at 1497.
86. Id.
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as with all types of standing, an injury in fact must exist.17 Second, the interest the petitioner asserts must be intertwined with
the right of the original party in interest, the detainee." For example, the interests of two parties are intertwined when a physician asserts the rights of his patients to have abortions. 9 The physician is an effective proponent of the patient's rights because each
party's right is intertwined with the other. The third requirement
of jus tertii standing is that some "genuine obstacle" to the detainee's assertion of his or her own right must exist. 90 For instance, a genuine obstacle exists when an issue becomes moot due
to timing factors that the real party in interest cannot control.91
b.

Citizen Standing

Citizen standing allows a petitioner to invoke the public interest in order to prevent the state from executing a person in
violation of the Constitution.9 Essentially, citizen standing occurs
only when a petitioner asserts the public interest.93 For example,
when a citizen asserts his status as a taxpayer he is essentially asserting citizen standing.'
In addition to injury in fact, there are two other requirements
for this general type of standing. The first requirement is that
there must be a link between the status that the petitioner claims

87. Singleton , 428 U.S. at 112.
88. Id. at 114. The relationship between the inmate and the petitioner
must be such that "enjoyment of the right is inextricably bound up with the
activity the litigant wishes to pursue." Id.
89. Id. at 115. The physician's own right, which is intertwined with the
patient's right, is the right to perform the abortions. Id. at 113. Another example is a licensed beer vendor asserting the rights of his male customers between the ages of eighteen and twenty because he lost the business of these
men as a result of the illegalization of the sale of beer to this group of people.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976). In this case, a licensed beer vendor
brought suit for injunctive relief against enforcement of a law which made the
sale of alcohol to males between eighteen and twenty years of age, illegal. Id.
The United States Supreme Court held that the petitioner had standing under the jus tertii theory because the petitioner's interests in selling beer to
men between the ages of eighteen and twenty were so intertwined with the
rights of the purchasers, that the petitioner was just as effective a proponent
of the right as an eighteen to twenty year-old. Id. at 196.
90. Wilson v. Lane, 697 F. Supp. 1489, 1495 (S.D. Il1. 1988).
91. Craig, 429 U.S. at 194. The court found that a male between eighteen
and twenty years of age could have a timing problem because he may reach
twenty-one years of age before the litigation would be complete. Id. at 192.
After the litigant reached twenty-one years of age, the court could dismiss the
case for having no justiciable issue. Id. at 194.
92. Wilson, 697 F. Supp. at 1496.
93. Id. The theory behind citizen standing in capital cases is that even
though the inmate does not wish to pursue his federal habeas remedy, there
is "a matter involving public interests of the highest degree." Id.
94. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
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and the type of legislation attacked.95 Taxpayers, for example,
must challenge the expenditure of federal tax funds." The second
requirement is that the petitioner must establish a link between
his or her status as a taxpayer and the type of "constitutional infringement alleged."9 7 Jus tertii standing and citizen standing involve petitioners asserting a detainee's rights for the petitioner's
own interest, unlike next-friend standing which requires a thirdparty to assert a detainee's rights for the detainee's own best interests."
c.

Next-friend Standing

Next-friend standing is the final theory available to third
parties who seek to intervene in capital cases. Under this theory, a
petitioner may act on behalf of a detainee when the detainee cannot act on his own behalf.99 Next-friend standing, unlike jus tertii
and citizen standing, requires the petitioner to assert the detainee's rights rather than the petitioner's rights.'0° A next-friend
petitioner must be solely dedicated to the best interests of the detainee. 10 ' In most instances, courts have required a significant relationship between the petitioner and the detainee.' °2 Moreover,
next-friend standing can be used only if the detainee himself could
°
For example, courts have held that mental innot file a petition.'O
capacity is sufficient to allow next-friend standing."'
The three types of standing requirements are important because they place significant limitations on third-party interference
with the legal process. The standing requirements ensure an adverse relationship between the parties by mandating an "injury in
fact.""° This adverse relationship is vital to the judicial system be-

95. Id. at 102. "[Tlhe taxpayer must establish a logical link between that
status and the type of legislative enactment attacked." Id.
96. Id. at 103.
97. Id. at 102. "[T]he taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status
and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged." Id.
98. In re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. 494, 494-95 (E.D. Tex. 1994).
99. Wilson v. Lane, 697 F. Supp. 1489, 1497 (S.D. IM.1988). There are
limitations on gaining standing under the next-friend theory. Id. at 1494. For
example, the petitioner must show that the detainee could not sue on his or
her own behalf. Id. at 1498. One common reason that a detainee cannot sue
on his or her own behalf is lack of competency. Id.
100. In re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. at 494-95.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 495. In Cockrum, the court found that the detainee's appointed
counsel had a significant relationship with the detainee. Id.
103. Wilson, 697 F. Supp. at 1497. The petitioner may show that the detainee cannot make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning
further litigation. In re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. at 495.
104. In re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. at 495.
105. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194 (1976); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
204(1962).
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cause it sharpens the presentation of the issues."°
B. Comparisonof Habeas Corpus Relief and Executive Clemency
The interests asserted in executive clemency petitions are
similar to the interests asserted in habeas corpus petitions. In
both situations the petitioner requests relief from a sentence of
death for himself or on behalf of another.' However, a significant
disparity exists between the standing requirements for federal habeas petitions and the requirements for executive clemency petitions. Third parties face more significant limitations when seeking
the writ of habeas corpus than when seeking executive clemency.'
For this reason, improper third-party intervention occurs more
frequently in habeas corpus situations.
By adopting stringent standing requirements for third parties, the courts have wisely limited third-party abuse of the judicial system.'09 Recognizing that the courts are not interested in
political, social and moral questions of general inquiry, the courts
have wisely kept third parties who seek to improperly present
such questions in the judicial context at bay. On the other hand,
because state governments have not imposed any type of standing
requirements for third-party intervention into executive clemency
decisions, third parties can still abuse the executive clemency system by using it as a forum to address issues important to them.
Although third-party issues and agendas may be important,
the executive clemency process is not the appropriate forum to address such issues.1 General political, social and moral questions
are the proper subject matter for the legislative branch of government and third parties wishing to make changes in the law should
be required to take those issues to the legislature."' Executive
clemency, on the other hand, is a process solely designed to extend
mercy or to correct judicial error."2 The doctrine of executive
106. Craig, 429 U.S. at 194; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898).
107. See supra notes 26-43 and 63-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of executive clemency and habeas corpus relief, respectively.
108. See supra notes 63-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
need to establish certain constitutionally mandated requirements, such as
standing and injury in fact, in order to qualify to petition for habeas corpus.
109. See generally Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (denying third
party intervention).
110. See supra notes 44-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
effects of third-party abuse of the executive clemency system.
111. But Cf, Alfieri, supra note 45 (explaining that modern abolitionist
strategy is to engage in a case by case attempt). See also Kurt Erickson, Outisders May be Banned by Clemency Process, THE PANTAGRAPH, May 8, 1996,
at A7. Representative Durksen's bill banning third party clemency petitions
passed the house by a vote of 99-17 and the Senate by a vote of 46-5. Id.
112. Pietrkowski, supra note 3, at 1405-09. Pietrkowski also lists clemency
as an entitlement under the Due Process Clause, but notes that this argument
frequently fails. Id. at 1411.
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of a
clemency calls for a case specific evaluation of the equities
1 3
particular punishment under the specific circumstances.
In addition to the use of the executive clemency process as a
political tool, third parties may actually hamper a detainee's
chance to obtain clemency. In the clemency process, executives
base their decisions on all of the relevant facts of a particular case.
Often, third parties collect these facts and present them to the executive. Instead of focusing solely on the facts and issues of a particular case that would create a reasonable basis for clemency,
third parties may attempt to assert their own political, social or
moral agenda, and in so doing may fail to provide adequate representation of the detainee's interest."' For these reasons, the doctrine of executive clemency should not remain vulnerable to thirdparty abuse. Therefore, state governors and legislatures should
impose strict standing requirements in order to limit inappropriate
third-party access to executive clemency.
III. STATES SHOULD ADOPT STANDING FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

In most states, under the lenient requirements of executive
clemency, almost anyone can petition on behalf of a detainee."'
This may be detrimental because third-party petitioners can abuse
the system by using executive clemency as a public forum to assert
their own political and social beliefs and to pursue their own interest under the guise of aiding the detainee." 6 Conversely, third
parties supporting an execution order can intervene in an attempt
to make the executive deny clemency on the basis of the intervenors' social, moral, or political views rather than the relevant facts
of the case. Section A demonstrates why third-parties may be deficient petitioners in capital cases. Section B explains how standing requirements would prevent third-party abuses of the executive clemency process.

113. Michael S. Serrill, Cathy and Gary in Medialand, TIME, May 27, 1985,
at 66. After rape victim Cathleen Crowell Webb recanted her accusation of
Gary Dotson as her rapist, Illinois Governor James Thompson granted executive clemency to Dotson. Id. At the time of Webb's recantation, Dotson had
spent six years in prison for the rape. Id. Although Thompson granted clemency, he did not grant a pardon because there was confusion as to what really
happened. Id. Thompson's decision turned on the specific circumstances of
the case: 1) Dotson served six years; 2) the circumstances left a "cloud over
the Illinois justice system"; and 3) Webb recanted soon after becoming a born
again Christian. Id.
114. See infra notes 122-150 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
deficiencies of third party petitioners.
115. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 1610.180 (1994).
116. See infra notes 117-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
detrimental effects of third-party intervention.
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A. Third PartiesMay Be Deficient Petitioners

Courts recognize that third parties asserting the detainee's
rights may not be the best proponents of those rights. 7 Improper
intervention in the habeas context would occur if courts permitted
third parties to intervene without injury in fact."" The courts acknowledge that without injury in fact a third party may not be the
best proponent of the detainee's rights. Ordinarily, the detainee is
the best proponent of his own rights. Similarly, in an executive
clemency petition, the detainee himself is probably the best proponent of his own rights."8
A third-party petitioner may be a deficient proponent of a detainee's rights for four reasons: (1) the third party's petition acts as
an obstacle for the detainee to file his own petition;20 (2) the third
party does not have the same base of information as the detainee;
(3) the third party has a different interest at stake than the detainee which may make the third party a less effective advocate of
the detainee's interest because the third-party does not adequately
assert the detainee's interest; and (4) the third party may put
pressure on the executive through the use of the media which may
cause the executive to base his or her decision on something other
than the relevant facts of the case. In all of these situations, the
third party simply may not represent the detainee's interests in
the best possible manner since the petitioner would likely pursue
his or her own agenda over that of the detainee. 2 '
1.

Third-PartyPetitionsMay Bar the Detainee

A third party may hamper the executive clemency process by
preventing a governor or reviewing board from hearing other petitions.122 A third-party petition may in fact bar other petitions, including a subsequent petition filed by the detainee himself.'' For
117. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976) (explaining that the

real party in interest is the best proponent of his own rights).
118. See generally Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990).

119. See id. (explaining that the policy behind requiring adversarial relationships is to sharpen the presentation of the issues).
120. ILL. PRISONER REV. BD., GUIDELINES FOR EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY 1

(1993) [hereinafter ILL. PRISONER REV. BD.]. The IPRB's Guidelines for Ex-

ecutive Clemency state "[n]o petition will be accepted for review within one
year of the date of the denial of a prior petition on behalf of the same individual. The Chairman of the Board may permit an exception to this limitation
for compelling reasons." Id. Thus, a detainee may be barred for one year from
filing his own petition, and that time period may prove to be a complete bar to
the detainee ever filing his own petition.
121. See supra notes 79 and 80 and accompanying text for a discussion of
how the doctrine of standing ensures an adversarial relationship between the
parties.
122. See ILL. PRISONER REV. BD., supra note 120, at 1 (allowing only one petition for executive clemency within a one-year time period).
123. Id.
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example, in Illinois, after denying a petition for executive clemency, the IPRB will not consider another petition until one year
has passed.' 24 The IPRB does allow, at the Chairperson's discretion, an exception to this rule.lu The exception requires the subsequent petitioner to demonstrate "compelling reasons" as to why
the IPRB should hear the petition. 2 Therefore the detainee must
demonstrate compelling reasons before he can make a plea for his
life to the IPRB2 7 This situation may occur when the detainee
originally opposed executive clemency on his behalf, but then
changed his mind.1 28 Not only is it inefficient to consider both petitions, it is unjust to require the detainee to show compelling circumstances.
In an extreme case, the detainee may purposely hinder the
petitioner in his efforts.'2
This actually occurred in People v.
Walker.'
Charles Walker was convicted of killing a man and a
woman in a robbery involving forty dollars."' After his conviction,
Walker wanted to die and opposed further discretionary appeals.'
Walker refused to aid the intervening third party in their attempt
at appeals on his behalf.3 s The third-party petition could impair a
detainee in this situation if the detainee later decides to petition"
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Karwath & Grady, supra note 16, at 1. Lloyd Wayne Hampton, a
death-row inmate who wanted to be executed, changed his mind on the evening before his execution. Id. The change was the result of an emotional plea
from Hampton's sister. Id. Another example of a death row inmate changing
his mind is John Louis Evans. Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execu.
tion, 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 853, 855 (1987). Evans was convicted of murder, and
demanded a death sentence and threatened to kill again if a death sentence
was not imposed. Id. However, Evans changed his mind and sought to have
his conviction overturned. Id.
129. Toby Eckert, Death Penalty Debate Moves To Spotlight Upcoming Gacy
Execution Focuses New Attention On Lengthy Appeals, PEORIA J. STAR, Jan.
17, 1994, at Al; White, supra note 128, at 853. A Utah court sentenced Gary
Gilmore to death for the murders of a service station attendant and a motel
clerk. Id. Gilmore wanted to die and resisted efforts by his attorneys to save
his life. Id. He went as far as firing his attorneys for appealing the case to
the Utah Supreme Court. Id.
130. 628 N.E.2d 1111, 1112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
131. Charles Bosworth Jr., Groups Ask Edgar to Stop Execution, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 7, 1992, at 4A.
132. Id. Charles Walker, the first man executed in Illinois since 1974, was
executed in September of 1990. David Heckelman, Second Death-Row Inmate
Asks Supreme Court To Drop Appeals, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 10, 1992, at
1.
133. Eckert, supra note 129, at Al.
134. Karwath & Grady, supra note 16, at 1. Lloyd Wayne Hampton, who
was sentenced to death for the torture-murder of an Illinois widower, had just
this type of change of heart concerning his execution. Id. About five hours
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If had Walker later decided to petition on his own behalf, he would
have faced an obstacle. The third party drafted its original petition against the detainee's will, without his cooperation and possibly lacking significant information. The detainee may be precluded from petitioning for one year."'
2. Different Knowledge Bases
Subtle but important facts relevant to the petition may not

come to light because the third-party petitioner, and not the detainee, produces the facts. The problem intensifies when the detainee opposes intervention,3 ' because the detainee may not cooperate and may refuse to release information that could help the
petitioner. 1 7 For example, where a husband/victim regularly beat
his wife (now on death row for the husband's murder) during the
course of the marriage, the petitioner should attempt to advance
the beatings as a foundation for mercy based clemency.'88 However, many of the relevant details which would establish the
beatings may not come to light because the detainee does not cooperate with the third-party petitioner. 8' Another problem arises
when the petitioner has a separate interest apart from the detainee's.
3. Separate Interests
Executive clemency is particularly vulnerable to abuse when
the third party is an interest group seeking clemency for the debefore his execution, after an emotional discussion with his sister, Hampton
decided that he wanted to pursue further appeals. Id.
135. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 20, § 1610.180 (1994).

136. Eckert, supra note 129, at Al. This type of interference occurred in the
case of Charles Walker. Id. Walker was a death row inmate who opposed further appeals and hindered interest groups from the appellate process. Id.
137. See White, supra note 128, at 854. For instance, the court convicted
Steven Judy of the rape and murder of a woman and subsequent drowning of
her three children. Id. During sentencing, Judy instructed his attorneys not
to present any mitigating evidence and not to oppose the death penalty. Id.
138. Mary Ann Dutton, UnderstandingWomen's Responses to Domestic Violence:A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191,
1193 (1993). Battered Woman Syndrome can be used for mitigation in both

the criminal prosecution of a battered woman, and executive clemency hearings of a woman who has been convicted of a crime. Id. When Battered
Woman Syndrome becomes an issue in a legal action, it is important for an
expert witness to conduct an analysis of the battered woman's experiences.
Id. at 1201-02. There are four categories that the expert should be aware of:
(1)the history and extent of violence between the victim and aggressor; (2)the
battered woman's psychological reactions to the violence; (3) the victim's responses to the violence and the consequences of those responses; and (4)the
context that induced battered woman's responses and reactions. Id. at 1202.
An expert witness can then aid the trier of fact in understanding the information pertaining to the battered woman. Id.
139. See id. (discussing what an expert should be aware of).
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tainee because the third party opposes the death penalty based on
its members' philosophical, social, or moral views." 0 Consider the
following hypothetical situation. A group decides to petition on
behalf of the detainee to advance its own political or moral interest
by opposing all executions. The purpose behind the group's peti14 1
tion is to gain greater acceptance of Battered Woman Syndrome
as a basis for executive clemency. 2 Moreover, the group wants to
use the detainee's case as an arena to advance its own cause, the
prevention of executions. However, the interest the third party
asserts is not necessarily in the best interest of the detainee. The
detainee might have made a better case for herself had she pursued theories other than Battered Woman Syndrome.' 3 The
problem results in the wrong interest being represented. The interest group wants its interest addressed rather than the best in-

140. Wilson v. Lane, 697 F. Supp. 1489, 1497 (S.D. 11. 1988). The court addressed the issue of interest groups who seek intervention in the form of habeas corpus relief on behalf of a prisoner condemned to death. Id. Specifically, the court addressed the use of the next-friend theory of standing by
these interest groups. Id. The court cited Webber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 514
(5th Cir. 1978), stating "The 'next-friend' expedient... may not be so abused
as to unleash on the courts a quasi-professional group of lay writers who seek
to right all wrongs." Wilson, 697 F. Supp. at 1497.
141. Dutton, supra note 138, at 1194-95. Battered Woman Syndrome is defined as a battered woman's reasonable belief that she is in danger when it is
not otherwise apparent to the outside observer. Id. This concept developed
because it is essential to understand a victimized woman's response to the
violence when domestic violence is an issue in the legal context. Id. at 1193.
Courts use Battered Woman Syndrome in several specific legal contexts, including: criminal proceedings against a domestic violence defendant; executive
clemency hearings for a battered woman who struck back against her aggressor; a battered woman's claims of personal injury; divorce proceedings and
child custody hearings. Id. Developments of the concept of Battered Woman
Syndrome include the expansion into the area of expert testimony. Id. at
1194. However, forensic evidence is not limited to testimony of the psychological reactions. Id. at 1195. Some relevant elements of a battered woman's
experiences include her prior responses to violence, the outcome of her responses, and the type of surrounding context. Id. at 1196. Battered Woman
Syndrome now includes psychological reactions to violence as well as cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions. Id. at 1197.
142. Id. at 1193. Courts are now applying scientific knowledge pertaining to
violence and the responses of women who are victims of chronic domestic
abuse to situations where battered women have been convicted of a crime. Id.
143. Edgar, supra note 46, at 2. Governor Edgar, in his press release, stated:
The fact that Guinevere Garcia is a woman has not influenced my decision. As I said, hundreds of men in comparable circumstances have
been spared the ultimate punishment by their fellow citizens, and I am
fully prepared to reject clemency for a woman under other circumstances. Some who have sought clemency in her behalf have raised the
possibility that she was a victim herself-a victim of battered woman
syndrome. However, the evidence does not support that assertion.
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terest of the detainee.'"
Under next-friend standing, a third party must be truly dedicated to the best interest of the detainee.' 5 Although interest
groups may claim that they seek intervention in the best interests
of the detainee, asserting a third-party interest does not always
achieve this goal. 146 Unless the group's interest is identical to the
detainee's, the group may not be acting in the best interest of the
detainee."" The detainee has her life at stake, and anyone advancing an interest other than the detainee's may be less effective.
4. Media Pressure

Third parties can intervene in the clemency process to either
support or oppose the granting of clemency. Some third parties attract media attention simply by getting involved.'4 Although this
media attention should not affect the executive's decision, it makes
the executive clemency system vulnerable to abuse.' 9 A third
party who wishes to create pressure on an executive might be able
to do so through media coverage of clemency hearings.u Although

144. Cf In re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. 494, 494-95 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (stating

that "the 'next-friend' must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person whose behalf he seeks to litigate and must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest.").
145. Id.
146. Killer Fighting,supra note 1, at 4A. Lloyd Wayne Hampton, in his letter addressing his competency, said:
I'm sure that the general consensus, especially among those opposed to
capital punishment, is that a man who would willingly go to his death is
incapable of making a rational choice.... It is my opinion that a man
who would willingly sit in a small cell for 24 hours a day year after year,
merely postponing the inevitable execution, is the irrational man.
Id.
147. In re Cockrum, 867 F. Supp. at 494-95. The next-friend must be "truly
dedicated to the best interests" of the detainee. Id.
148. At Guinivere Garcia's clemency hearing celebrity Bianca Jagger of Amnesty International spoke on behalf of Garcia and attracted widespread media
attention. O'Connell, supra note 16, at 1.
149. See Kobil, supra note 3, at 607-08 (highlighting the dangers of granting
or denying clemency to a governor's political career). In 1893, Governor John
Peter Altgeld of Illinois courageously granted clemency to three surviving anarchists convicted in connection with the infamous Haymarket bombing in
Chicago. Id. at 607. The Governor's grant of clemency drew nationwide attention and created a "firestorm" of criticism. Id. Altgeld became "one of the
most reviled men in the country" and subsequently rejected by the voters in
his bid for re-election. Id. Similarly, former Governors Pat Brown of California and Michael DiSalle of Ohio suffered political problems because of media
and public reaction to clemency decisions. Id. at 608. Moreover, some governors have been accused of luring votes by granting clemency to particularly
sympathetic criminals. See Becker, supra note 52, at 337 (discussing Illinois
Jim Edgar's decision to grant clemency to four battered women).
150. Illinois Representative James Durkin referred to the Illinois Prisoner
Review Board hearing over Guinivere Garcia's clemency decision as a
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in an ideal system, the media coverage would not affect the clemency process, in reality it exposes the system to potential abuse.
B. Standing Prevents Third-PartyAbuse
Whitmore v. Arkansas51 illustrates how the doctrine of
standing effectively curtails abuse of the judicial system. In
Whitmore, the Court barred a third party from petitioning the
Court for habeas corpus relief.lu The third party attempted to intervene as an individua'u and as the detainee's next-friend.'" The
third party was a fellow death row inmate who had exhausted his
own state court appellate review, but had not sought federal habeas corpus relief.15 After the detainee waived his right to a direct
appeal, 5 the petitioner attempted to intervene and seek habeas
corpus relief on behalf of his fellow death row inmate.5 7 In essence, the third-party petitioner was asserting his fellow death
row inmate's habeas corpus petition even though the petitioner
had not yet filed his own habeas corpus petition.
The Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's attempt to intervene as an individual because his claim of injury in fact was too
speculative to invoke Article III jurisdiction.'6 The Court also rejected the petitioner's claim that the Eighth Amendment'59 protected him'8 0 under citizen standing. 8' Finally, the Court rejected
petitioner's claim under the next-friend theory of standing.
"sideshow." Becker, supra note 52, at 337.
151. 495 U.S. 149, 151-54 (1990).
152. Id. at 166.
153. Id. To petition a court as an individual, "the complainant must allege
an injury to himself that is 'distinct and palpable." Id. at 155.
154. Id. at 153. The petitioner invoked both jus tertii and citizen standing
as an individual. Id.
155. Id. at 156.
156. Id. at 152. Arkansas law did not require a mandatory appeal in every
death penalty case. Id. at 153. However, to forgoe direct appeal the detainee
must have the capacity to understand the choice between life and death and
the decision to waive the appeal must be knowing and intelligent. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 157. In holding that the- petitioner's injury in fact was "too
speculative," the Court noted that there was no factual basis for the contention that the sentence imposed on a mass murderer would be relevant to a future comparative review of the petitioner's robbery-murder sentence. Id.
159. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment states "[elxcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." Id.
160. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 160.
161. Id. Petitioner contended that as an Arkansas citizen he was protected
under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. Petitioner also
contended that he had a right to invoke the Court's jurisdiction to make sure
that appellate review was carried out. Id. The Court held that the petitioner
raised only the "generalized interest of all citizens," and held that that is not
an adequate basis on which to grant standing. Id.
162. Id. at 165. The Court noted that a prerequisite for a third party to pe-
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Whitmore illustrates how the doctrine of standing can bar a
remote third-party petitioner from judicial adjudication. The doctrine of standing also tends to sharpen the presentation of issues
and information to the court. The sharpening of the presentation
of the issues may be lost in the executive clemency context because
of lenient requirements for third-party intervention. The underlying judicial policy of having the best party assert the rights" is not
served in the executive clemency context because third parties can
intervene without any limits on standing. Third parties may intervene against a detainee's will and assert their own agenda.
This is not only unfair to the detainee, but the citizens of the state
are going to have to finance this type of abuse of the system. As
demonstrated above, the judicial imposition of stringent standing
requirements effectively protects the integrity of the judicial process itself. Similarly, standing in the executive clemency context
would likely diminish third-party abuse of the system.
IV. CORRECTIVE MEASURES

Legislative action can correct the inadequacies of executive
clemency. This Comment discusses two corrective measures. Section A examines at newly enacted legislation in Illinois. Section B
suggests an alternative that should be implemented nationwide.
A

Newly Enacted Illinois Legislation

Recognizing the need to limit third-party petitions for executive clemency, legislators in Illinois have enacted legislation that
changes the procedures for filing executive clemency petitions.'"
The amendment requires third parties to get a detainee's written
consent before petitioning for executive clemency on behalf of the
detainee.'" The amendment allows a petitioner to file an application for executive clemency without the written consent of the detainee if the detainee suffers from a mental or physical condition

tition as a detainee's next-friend is that the detainee must not be able to himself give a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights. Id. The
Court further noted that since the Supreme Court of Arkansas found that the
detainee was competent, this prerequisite was not met. Id. at 166. Consequently, the petitioner lacked standing under the next-friend theory. Id.
163. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976). The rationale is that the
real party in interest is the best proponent of his or her own rights. Id. This is
because any other party may attempt to assert a different interest. Id.
164. The proposal would alter 730 ILCS 5/3-13(c).
165. H.R. 2658, 89th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1996). The bill stated in relevant
part that "[aipplication for executive clemency under this Section may not be
commenced on behalf of a person who has been sentenced to death without
the written consent of the defendant, unless the defendant, because of a mental or physical condition, is unable to understand the nature and purpose of
the proceeding." Id.
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1
or cannot understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings.'
1 7
The changes also apply to petitions for post-conviction relief' and
8
petitions for habeas corpus relief. '
This legislation is a large step toward instituting the judicial
Spestanding requirements in the executive clemency context.'
cifically, it imposes requirements similar to the requirements under the theory of next-friend standing.170 However, the new law
does not require "injury in fact." Under the new law, as in the case
of next-friend standing, the third party cannot petition for relief on
opposed intervenbehalf of the detainee if a competent detainee
7
'
tion and refused to give written permission.
Several issues arose during the Illinois House of Representatives debate on the bill.77 The debate questioned the impact of
barring a third-party petition.7 7 The main concern was whether
the same information would be available to the Governor if the
third party did not intervene. 7 4 Proponents of the measure responded by stressing that all relevant information would remain
available. However, third parties would not have the opportunity
to highlight irrelevant information.'75 By precluding third-party
petitions, issue-oriented third parties could not abuse the clemency
process by asserting their own agendas. 76 The enactment of this
law eliminates the problem arising from the separate interests between the detainee and the petitioner.

B. Proposal
The optimal solution to the problem of improper third-party
intervention would be to implement the doctrine of standing in the
executive clemency process. Executives should require petitioners
for executive clemency to have judicial standing because standing
prevents abuses of the system. The doctrine of standing is appro166. Id.
167. Id. Similarly, the amendment affecting post-conviction relief would alter the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, 725 ILCS 5/122-1.
168. Id. The bill would also affect habeas corpus relief and alters the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure by amending 735 ILCS 5/10-103.
169. Wilson v. Lane, 697 F. Supp. 1489, 1497 (S.D. IM.1988). Both the proposed legislation and next-friend standing allows third-party intervention
when the detainee is incompetent. Id.
170. Id.
171. HR 2658.
172. Tape of debate on House Bill 2658, held by the Illinois House of Representatives (Feb. 21, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Debate]. During
the House debate, Representative Blagojevich posed various hypothetical
situations that may be affected if H.R. 2658 was enacted. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See supra notes 117-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
third-parties can abuse the clemency process.
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priate because it blends constitutional limitations with practical
policy considerations.'77 The doctrine of standing would limit
third-party petitioners for executive clemency to people who have
an "injury in fact." 7 ' This requirement prevents improper third
parties from petitioning for habeas corpus relief and imposing
their social, political or moral views in the judicial system. The
doctrine of standing would impose a stricter limit on third parties
than the newly enacted legislation in Illinois. Yet the doctrine of
standing allows third parties to intervene
when intervention is
179
appropriate and beneficial to the detainee.
CONCLUSION
Third-party intervention renders the executive clemency
process extremely vulnerable to abuse, and the doctrine of standing would put an immediate end to such abuses. At present, parties that lack standing can intervene simply to create political
pressure on the executive and publicity for the case. Many lawyers disagree over the effect of stirring up publicity before a clemency hearing8 0 Although it is often the case that publicity might
benefit the detainee, this is not necessarily true. Without standing
requirements, anyone, including law enforcement officials, proponents of the death penalty, and members of the victims' families
are free to intervene in the executive clemency process and petition in favor of the execution. The decision to grant executive
clemency is of the highest importance. Political pressure, moral,
or social beliefs, whether they be in favor of or against clemency
generally, should not influence the executive's decision in any way.
The judicial standing requirements ensure that courts will only accommodate parties with an injury in fact.
Executive clemency needs limits on third-party intervention.
The doctrine of standing has proven an effective limitation on
third-party intervention in the habeas corpus context. The combination of policy considerations and constitutional limitations make
the doctrine of judicial standing an ideal guideline to limit thirdparty petitioners seeking executive clemency. Executive clemency
is especially suited for the doctrine of standing because it would
prevent abuses of executive clemency. The United States Constitution imposes the doctrine of standing in the area of habeas corpus relief, but there is currently a need for legislative action limiting third-party intervention in executive clemency. Executive
177. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
178. See supra notes 79 and 80 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the adversarial relationship.
179. See, e.g., Wilson v. Lane, 697 F. Supp. 1489, 1496 (S.D. Ill 1988)
(discussing the advantages of granting next-friend standing to third parties
who intervene in court cases on behalf of incompetent defendants).
180. Abramowitz & Paget, supra note 27, at 172.
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clemency should not be vulnerable in a way that allows intervention to third parties who seek to "right all wrongs." 8' If the executive clemency process used the doctrine of standing to limit thirdparty intervention, abuses therein would cease to exist.

181. Wilson, 697 F. Supp. at 1497.

